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Sen, Sraffa and the revival of classical political economy
Nuno Ornelas Martins*
University of the Azores, Azores, Portugal, and Centro de Estudos em Gesta˜o e Economia
In his new book The Idea of Justice, Amartya Sen argues that political theory should
not consist only in the characterisation of ideal situations of perfect justice. In so doing,
Sen is making, within the context of political theory, a similar argument to another he
also made in economic theory, when crtiticising what he called the ‘rational fool’ of
mainstream economics. Sen criticised the ideal and fictitious agent of mainstream
economics, while advocating for a return to an integrated view of ethics and economics,
which characterised many classical political economists who inspired Sen’s theory of
justice, from Adam Smith to Karl Marx. I will examine Sen’s revival of classical
political economy, and argue that a revival of classical political economy, which was
undertaken earlier by Piero Sraffa, has much potential for bringing a more plural and
realist perspective to economics.
Keywords: Sen; Sraffa; classical political economy; mainstream economics;
multidimensionality
Introduction
In his new book The Idea of Justice, Sen (2009) provides a critique of what he calls
‘transcendental’ theories of justice, which consist in a characterisation of an ideal situation
achieved through a social contract, leading to a perfect arrangement which cannot be
further improved. This approach, Sen argues, characterises the work of authors like
Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Immanuel Kant, and is still
present in the work of John Rawls, who in his theory of justice describes what would be a
perfectly just society. Sen instead recommends a ‘comparative’ approach to justice,
focusing on the comparison between different real outcomes and realisations, and not on
‘transcendental’ ideal arrangements:
There is, obviously, a radical contrast between an arrangement-focused conception of justice
and a realization-focused understanding: the latter must, for example, concentrate on the
actual behaviour of people, rather than presuming compliance by all with ideal behaviour.
In contrast with transcendental institutionalism, a number of other Enlightenment theorists
took a variety of comparative approaches that were concerned with social realizations
(resulting from actual institutions, actual behaviour and other influences). Different versions
of such comparative approaches can be found, for example, in the works of Adam Smith, the
Marquis of Condorcet, Jeremy Bentham, Mary Wollstonecraft, Karl Marx, John Stuart Mill,
among a number of other leaders of innovative thought in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries (Sen 2009, p. 7).
By advancing this perspective on justice, Sen is making a parallel argument to another
one he had already made within economic theory. Contemporary mainstream economic
theory typically consists in the construction of economic models which characterise ideal
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situations, while positing assumptions about the behaviour of human agents that have little
connection with reality. Sen (1977, 1997, 2002) criticised the fictitious conception of the
human agent adopted in mainstream economics, where several fictitious assumptions are
made. Walsh (2000, 2003, 2008) and Putnam (2002) argue that in so doing Sen has
contributed to a return of classical political economy, a perspective which includes many
of the authors who inspired Sen’s approach to justice, such as Adam Smith, John Stuart
Mill and Karl Marx. Walsh and Putnam argue that Sen’s project continues a revival of
political economy that had taken place earlier in the work of Piero Sraffa. In this paper,
I will argue for a continuation of this revival of classical political economy, while
suggesting that such a revival helps us address many contemporary problems. It is not just
in political theory that we need a theory focused on realisations and actual behaviour, as
opposed to a transcendental theory presupposing ideal behaviour, but also in economics
where economic models have also been developed based on a fictitious conception of
rationality and behaviour, as Sen argued long ago.
The two stages of the revival of classical political economy
According to Walsh (2000) and Putnam (2002), the revival of classical political
economy in the twentieth century has occurred in two stages. The first stage was led
by Piero Sraffa who criticised the marginalist framework, and recovered the analytical
structure of classical political economy in a ‘minimalist’ framework concerned with
only prices and quantities. The second stage is Amartya Sen’s return to the integrated
analysis of human behaviour and well-being that characterised classical political
economy.
The distinction that Walsh and Putnam make between a minimalist analytical
framework and a rich description of human behaviour and well-being is to some extent
parallel to other distinctions made in the literature on Sraffa by such authors as Garegnani
(1998, 2005) and Pasinetti (1993). Garegnani (1998, p. 419) suggests a distinction between
the ‘core’ of an economywith the ‘competitive price equations’ and awider field of analysis
which must resort to ‘what Marshall used to call “specific experience”’ (1920, p. 637).
Despite differences in some respects, a similar distinction is made by Pasinetti (1993, 2005)
who distinguishes between the ‘pure theory’ outlined in Sraffa’s (1960) system and
‘institutional analysis’, which cannot be undertaken only through quantitative analysis.
While the study of prices and quantities leads to a ‘pure theory’ of the ‘core’ economic
relationships, the study of the concrete social arrangements through which social activity
takes place consists in an ‘institutional analysis’ which must resort to ‘specific experience’
to guide our knowledge of human behaviour.
What Walsh (2000, 2003, 2008) and Putnam (2002) argue is that while Sraffa in his
published writings was essentially concerned with the ‘pure theory’ of the ‘core’ equations
of prices and quantities, Sen’s contribution is at the level of the ‘institutional analysis’ of
actual behaviour. This does not mean that Sraffa did not develop a conception of
institutions and human behaviour. As Davis (1988, 2002) and Sen (2003) argue, Sraffa had
indeed a very sophisticated conception at that level too, one which was significantly
influenced by Antonio Gramsci. But Sraffa’s main published work, the Production of
Commodities, addressed essentially a ‘core’ or ‘pure theory’ constituted by the economy’s
competitive price equations.
When describing the ‘core’ or ‘pure theory’ in terms of the economy’s competitive
price equations, Sraffa (1960) developed a multidimensional perspective on production
which summarises the key tenets of the classical analytical framework. As Sraffa
N.O. Martins144
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(D3/12/13/1(3)) notes in one of his unpublished manuscripts, we should not look at partial
changes (assuming everything else constant, as Marshall did), but rather at the conditions
for the permanent repetition of the process in its totality (while also looking only at
observable entities). For this reason, in the Production of Commodities, Sraffa focuses on
an ‘instantaneous photograph’ of the overall economic process, while taking into account
whether this ‘instantaneous photograph’ describes the conditions for a continuous
repetition of the process in its totality.
A focus on the reproduction of the economic process in its totality was central to the
classical political economists from Smith to Marx, and it is this notion of the reproduction
of the conditions for the permanent repetition of the process in its totality that Sraffa
recovers. But it is not just the conditions of reproduction of the economic system that the
classical political economists analysed, but also the conditions for the reproduction of
society – for example, of the social classes and social structures in general.
In his recent book The Idea of Justice, then, Sen (2009, p. 245) notes that we must
‘distinguish adequately between the individual characteristics that are used in the capability
approach and the social influences that operate on them’. Sen clarified this distinction when
answering questions from the audience in a seminar on ‘Justice, HumanValues and Political
Economy’ at the University of Coimbra (14 March 2011), when he argued that
‘the individual and society are two distinct objects’. For Sen, society, like the individual, is
an object of analysis. The use of the term ‘object’ may generate some confusion, since it
seems to denote a static entity. But as John Searle argues:
Social objects are always ( . . . ) constituted by social acts; and, in a sense, the object is just the
continuous possibility of the activity. A twenty dollar bill, for example, is a standing
possibility of paying for something (Searle 1995, p. 36, emphasis in original).
One cannot help noting the analogy between Searle’s idea of a social object as a
continuous possibility of (or, using Sen’s terms, capability for) an activity, and Sraffa’s
idea of the continuous reproduction of a process. Sen’s reference to society and individuals
as different objects should not be taken to denote two static entities, but rather two
continuing processes, the individual and the society in which the individual is placed.
But as Sen stressed in his Coimbra presentation, although the individual and society are
‘different objects’ and both are needed for social analysis, they are not ‘independent
objects’. We cannot have individuals without society and social relations in our social
theory, andwe also cannotmake the conversemistake of having societywithout individuals:
When someone thinks and chooses and does something, it is, for sure, that person – and not
someone else – who is doing these things. But it would be hard to understand why and how
he or she undertakes these activities without some comprehension of his or her societal
relations.
The basic issue was put with admirably clarity by Karl Marx [1959: 104] more than a century
and a half ago: ‘What is to be avoided above all is the re-establishing of “Society” as an
abstraction vis-a`-vis the individual’. The presence of individuals who think, choose and act –
a manifest reality in the world – does not make an approach methodologically individualist.
It is the illegitimate invoking of any presumption of independence of the thoughts and actions
of persons from the society around them that would bring the feared beast into the living room
(Sen 2009, p. 245).
Society is thus a condition for the permanent repetition of individual activity, though in the
sense of a continuous process, rather than a static abstraction.
Although Sen stresses that Marx is an author who explained the relationship between
individual and social structures especially clearly, Sen also draws on Smith’s account of
Journal of Economic Methodology 145
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general rules of conduct to explain the influence of society and social structure, including
social rules, on the individual:
acceptance of rules of conduct toward others with whom one has some sense of identity is part
of a more general behavioral phenomenon of acting according to fixed rules, without
following the dictates of goal maximization. Adam Smith had emphasized the importance of
such ‘rules of conduct’ in social achievement: ‘Those general rules of conduct, when they
have been fixed in our mind by habitual reflection, are of great use in correcting
misrepresentations of self-love concerning what is fit and proper to be done in our particular
situation ([1790]:160)’ (Sen 2002, pp. 216–217).
For Sen, the role of social structures is fundamental not only for human activity in general,
but also for the development of our conceptions of the world:
as Antonio Gramsci, perhaps the most innovative Marxist philosopher of the twentieth
century, put it, nearly eighty years ago, in his Letters from Prision, while incarcerated in a
fascist jail in Turi: ‘in acquiring one’s conception of the world one always belongs to a
particular grouping which is that of all the social elements which share the same mode of
thinking and acting. We are all conformists of some conformism or other, always man-in-the-
mass or collective man’ [Gramsci 1975: 324] (Sen 2009, p. 119).
The influence of social structures on the individual as described by Sen is similar to
the perspective of many authors who argue for a different economics, noting not only the
influence of social structures on the individual (for example, Lawson 2003), but also the
role that identity plays in this context (see Davis 2010). Lawson (2003, p. 40), for example,
writes that in his view, ‘social reality is recognised as being continuously reproduced and
transformed’, where ‘social structure is the (often unacknowledged) condition of our
actions, and its reproduction/transformation the (often unintended) outcome’.
Multidimensionality and the critique of mainstream economics
There are many economic traditions, often designated ‘heterodox’ (see, for example,
Lawson 2003; Davis 2010), which criticise the methodological individualism of
mainstream economics and adopt instead a similar perspective on the reproduction of
society to the one adopted by Sen (2009). Thus, Lawson (2003) notes that Marxian
Economics, Post Keynesianism, Social Economics, Feminist Economics and Institutional
Economics, amongst others, also focus on the reproduction of society, rather than starting
from a methodological individualist perspective. Davis (2010) addresses these heterodox
traditions and Sen’s own approach to the individual, applying Sen’s capability approach in
order to understand how the individual is embedded in a social structure. These
interrelations between competing approaches are certainly worth investigating, since they
return us to a conception of the reproduction of society which was, like the reproduction of
the economy explained by Sraffa (1960), a central issue in classical political economy, and
thus very important for a revival of classical political economy.1
While Marx focuses essentially on social structure, then, Smith’s analysis is essentially
concerned with the psychological structure of the individual and the effects that general
rules of conduct have on this structure. But Smith’s perspective, like Mill and Marx’s
perspective, was a multidimensional one. Mill goes beyond (while Marx harshly criticises)
Bentham’s adoption of a unidimensional approach to well-being, where all pleasures can be
reduced to a common unit. Mill and Marx adopt instead a richer (multidimensional)
conception of well-being, which Sen seeks to recover. When seeking a richer analysis of
well-being, Sen argues, paraphrasing Wildon Carr, ‘[i]n social investigation and
measurement, it is undoubtedly more important to be vaguely right than to be precisely
N.O. Martins146
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 b
y
 [
b
-o
n
: 
B
ib
li
o
te
ca
 d
o
 c
o
n
h
ec
im
en
to
 o
n
li
n
e 
U
A
C
] 
at
 0
7
:0
4
 2
2
 J
u
n
e 
2
0
1
2
 
wrong’ (1989, p. 45).2 But Sen’s statement must be interpreted carefully. In fact, Sen and
also Sraffa are not amongst the economists who operate within a framework in which one
can never be ‘precisely wrong’. It was Sraffa’s concern with precision that led him to
criticise the neoclassical marginalist theory of production and to formulate an alternative
economic theory which takes into account the multidimensionality of the production
process and its implications.
Analogously, Sen’s concern with mathematical precision also led him to formulate
axiomatically many of his ideas regarding the multidimensional nature of rational choice
and social choice. For example, it was a concern with precision that lead Sen to note how
Arrow’s ‘impossibility’ theorem also applies to the Bergson–Samuelson framework,
contrary to what Little (1952) and Samuelson (in a foreword to Graaf 1967) argued (see
Sen 1982, pp. 251–256, 336–337). In fact, I would argue that while Sraffa’s framework
undermines the methodological grounds for the neoclassical aggregate production
function, as shown in the Cambridge Capital Theory Controversies (see Harcourt 1972;
Sen 1974), which started in the public domain with Robinson (1953), Sen’s work on social
choice theory shows inconsistencies of the neoclassical aggregate utility function, as
developed from the contributions of Bergson (1938) and Samuelson (1947). That is, using
a multidimensional perspective, Sraffa and Sen together identify two aggregation
problems in key neoclassical frameworks.
Moreover, the use of a multidimensional perspective has implications not only for the
neoclassical aggregate utility function, but also for any utility function. For all utility
functions used in mainstreammicroeconomics presuppose a complete preference ordering,
but Sen (1977, 1997, 2002) argues that complete orderingsmay not exist even at the level of
individual preferences too. For example, Sen argues that incompleteness of individual
preferencesmay arise from value conflicts, as in the case Sen (1997) designates as ‘assertive
incompleteness’. Here ethical values are found to undermine the methodological
presuppositions of mainstream economics. But incompleteness may also arise because of
the need to act before the judgemental process has been completed, a circumstance that Sen
(1997) calls ‘tentative incompleteness’ where time constraints are one of the factors
generating incompleteness.
Consequently, Sen proposes a multidimensional framework in which behaviour is
understood in terms of the multiple motivations that influence the human agent, and human
well-being also depends on multiple dimensions, as explained in his ‘capability approach’
(Sen 1985). Sen’s method, in moving from one complete ordering to multiple orderings,
where these orderings may be incomplete, forecloses constructing a utility function, since
the latter presupposes the existence of a complete preference ordering. Sen’s work on
rationality and preferences consequently undermines the axiomatic basis of mainstream
microeconomics, since the use of utility functions requires the existence of complete
orderings. Hence, it is not just the neoclassical production function, widely used in
mainstream macroeconomics, that has weak foundations, as Sraffa has shown, but also the
neoclassical utility function widely used inmainstreammicroeconomics, as has Sen shown.
What both Sraffa and Sen thus recommend as an alternative to the unidimensional
perspective of mainstream (macro andmicro) economics is a multidimensional perspective
on production (developed by Sraffa) and on behaviour and well-being (developed by Sen).
As the titles of key books of Sraffa and Sen show, while Sraffa (1960) focuses on the
‘production of commodities’, Sen (1985) focuses on going from ‘commodities’ to
‘capabilities’, where in both cases a multidimensional perspective is advanced.
There are other important differences between mainstream economics and classical
political economy brought out by Sraffa and Sen: whilemainstream economics presupposes
Journal of Economic Methodology 147
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closed systems (Lawson 2003), the contributions of Sraffa and Sen presuppose ultimately
an open system. Sraffa’s economic system is an open system, where prices and the
distribution of income are not automatically determined, since the setting of either wages,
profits or of the price of a given commodity is determined outside the system.
The mathematics of Sraffa’s system is not meant to deliver an exact prediction, but is used
instead to show the internal inconsistencies of the marginalist framework, while at the same
time defending the classical perspective that prices tend to the cost of production [which
must not be interpreted in terms of Marshall’s (1920) ‘real cost’, as Sraffa (1960) notes].
In fact, Sraffa is very aware of the dangers of using a given mathematical technique
uncritically, as Marcuzzo and Roselli (2011, p. 219) note, Sraffa (D3/12/4/15) writes that
‘Our metaphysics is in fact embodied in our technique; the danger lies in this, that when
we have succeeded in thoroughly mastering a technique, we are very liable to be mastered
by her.’ This is precisely what has occurred within mainstream economics, which has
become defined in terms of the use of mathematical techniques, on the assumption that this
is the only way to become scientific, but leading to the neglect, for example, of the moral
dimension of classical political economy since ethics is not taken to be a ‘scientific’ topic.
This has led mainstream economics to attempt predicting exactly (in a ‘scientific’ way)
human behaviour, but as Sen argues: ‘the use of “rational choice” in economics and related
disciplines is very often indirect, particularly as a predicting device for actual behavior,
and this can often overshadow the direct use of rationality’ (2002, p. 42).
Sen (2002, p. 4) recommends instead, then, seeing rationality not as the exercise in
following a preference ordering, but rather as the ability to scrutinise and revise preference
orderings. For Sen, preferences may not be complete, and thus we do not have a
deterministic approach to behaviour, but rather a situation where we cannot predict human
behaviour in an exact way. For both Sraffa and Sen we have amultidimensional perspective
which presupposes open systems, which contrasts with the unidimensional perspective of
mainstream economics which presupposes closed systems. Furthermore, although Sraffa
and Sen engage in a critique of the unidimensional approach ofmainstream economics, their
own contributions are not finished projects. In fact, both require further elaboration. Thus
Sraffa writes, in the preface to Production of Commodities:
It is . . . a peculiar feature of the set of propositions now published that, although they do not
enter into any discussion of the marginal theory of value and distribution, they have
nevertheless been designed to serve as the basis for a critique of that theory (Sraffa 1960, p. vi).
Sraffa’s work is thus a basis for a critique of marginalism, or ‘marginism’, as he used to
call it (see Marcuzzo and Roselli 2011), and for the development of an alternative
conception of the economy, but it is not a fully specified theory. The same is true of Sen’s
work. Sen refers to the classical political economists from Smith to Marx when explaining
his conception of the individual and society, but he does not fully elaborate a theory of the
individual and of the society, or a theory of the way in which they continuously reproduce
themselves.
There have been many efforts to develop Sraffa’s approach. Walsh mentions one of
these, namely that of Luigi Pasinetti, which also could be fruitfully linked with Sen’s
writings:
‘It is, I believe, very significant that a theorist who played one of the key roles in the first phase
of the classical revival, and began to publish work some considerable time ago that had deeply
‘second stage’ characteristics – namely Luigi Pasinetti – has been exploring the concept of
needs in a way that links up with Sen’s writings (Walsh 2000, p. 22).
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Walsh argues that the interaction between Pasinetti’s approach and Sen’s thinking can be
mutually enriching: ‘I think Pasinetti needs Sen’s capability approach. But I also think that
Sen needs Pasinetti’s approach to growth theory’ (Walsh 2008, p. 229). This is an argument
endorsed not only by Walsh, but also by Putnam, for Walsh cites Putnam as saying that
‘capability theory needs to be cashed out by supplementing it with the kind of socially
responsible growth theory provided by Pasinetti’ (Walsh 2008, p. 230). The precise way in
which Pasinetti’s approach may complement Sen’s is then explained in Walsh (2003,
pp. 372–373). Pasinetti himself writes, when commenting on Sen’s work: ‘it is interesting
that, starting from the realization that the traditional approach simply comes down, in many
circumstances, to analyzing the behaviour of “rational fools”, his proposal is essentially
that of widening the conceptual framework (see Sen 1977, 1985)’ (Pasinetti 1993, p. 110).
Here Pasinetti seems to expect something more from Sen than simply widening the
conceptual framework. The issue at stake is a deep one. Sen’s work can be seen to be part of
what wemay term as the Cambridge ‘welfare’ tradition that began with Sidgwick,Marshall
and Pigou (see Martins 2009b, 2011a). Pasinetti’s contribution, on the other hand, is part of
the Cambridge Keynesian tradition, which begins with John Maynard Keynes’ critique of
the Marshallian and Pigovian framework (see Harcourt 2003).
The Cambridge ‘welfare’ tradition emphasises consensus, as in Marshall’s attempt to
reconcile marginalism with classical political economy in his neoclassical approach, as
Veblen (1900) termed it. TheCambridgeKeynesian tradition, on the other hand, emphasises
vigorous critique of mainstream economics. This may explain why Pasinetti seems to
expect somethingmore fromSen than simplywidening the conceptual framework. Iwill not
address here the questions concerning which of the particular developments of Sraffa’s
revival of classical political economy would be more appropriate to combine with Sen’s
revival of classical political economy. There are various ways in which Sraffa’s framework
has been developed by several authors, and the issue is too complicated to address here. Iwill
simply note that Sraffa and Sen’s frameworks are complementary, and there is much
substantive work to be done to develop not only Sraffa’s framework (as Pasinetti does), but
also Sen’s own perspective, as will be argued now.
The nature of Sen’s capability approach
Sen’s capability approach is not a fully specified theory. In fact, neither is it a fully specified
social theory, nor a fully specified ethical theory. Sen addresses the individual and society as
distinct but not independent objects which influence each other. He emphasises this when
responding to the claim that his capability approach is an individualist theory. But Sen does
not elaborate on this, and does not develop a concrete social theory. Neither does he develop
a fully specified ethical theory. In his capability approach, Sen (1985, 1999) argues that
human well-being consists in the expansion of human capabilities. However, he also notes
that the capability approach does not provide a complete theory of justice. The capability
approach identifies human capabilities as the space inwhichwell-being is assessed. But Sen
(1999) argued, when proposing the capability approach, that a complete theory of justice
would have to provide not only a space for assessing well-being, but also a criterion which
would allow comparison of different social states – I discuss this issue in more detail in
Martins (2007a).
In his new book The Idea of Justice, Sen (2009) provides an answer to the problem of
the decision criterion for a theory of justice. The answer is that any decision criterion must
not be imposed, but should rather be found through a democratic process. Here Sen is
again following Smith’s perspective, where it is through our confrontation with others that
Journal of Economic Methodology 149
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 b
y
 [
b
-o
n
: 
B
ib
li
o
te
ca
 d
o
 c
o
n
h
ec
im
en
to
 o
n
li
n
e 
U
A
C
] 
at
 0
7
:0
4
 2
2
 J
u
n
e 
2
0
1
2
 
we develop less partial views of virtue and justice. For Smith, our assessment of an action
depends on our ability to provide impartial assessments. But our own perspective
(or sympathetic fellow-feeling) may be too much influenced by our own position, and
hence the need of debating with others. Smith writes:
In solitude, we are apt to feel too strongly whatever relates to ourselves; we are apt to over-rate
the good offices we may have done, and the injuries we may have suffered: we are apt to be
too much elated by our own good, and too much dejected by our own bad fortune.
The conversation of a friend brings us to a better, that of a stranger to a still better temper
(Smith 2002, p. 178).
That is, the confrontation of our perspective with those of others is essential to our ability
to make impartial assessments, and if others are not available to do so, we must imagine an
impartial spectator who will do so. This enables us to assess a given situation from various
positions in order to achieve what Sen calls ‘positional objectivity’. For Sen (2009, p. 157)
‘“positional objectivity” is about the objectivity of what can be observed from a specified
position’. Sen’s (2009, pp. 124–154) notion of ‘open impartiality’ then concerns exactly
this confrontation of our perspective with that of others who can belong to many different
positions and groups within a given society, or even outside that society, in order to
achieve positional objectivity and avoid what Sen calls ‘parochialism’.
So Sen’s solution to the problem of finding a criterion for justice is that such a criterion
must not be imposed, but rather found through democratic procedures. Rather than
providing a prescriptive criterion, Sen’s capability approach is centred on the description of
the objects of ethical valuation. Sen then identifies functionings and capabilities as the
relevant objects for ethical valuation, leaving their valuation itself for public debate. But if
Sen’s capability approach is not a fully specified social theory, nor a fully specified theory of
justice, thenwhat is it? I argue that Sen’s capability approach is an ontological theory,where
by ontology I mean a study of the nature of reality, including what types of objects exist.
Thus, an approach which is centred on the characterisation of objects for ethical valuation,
such as ‘functionings’ and ‘capabilities’, is essentially an ontological approach, which
provides the objects that we may then use when engaging in democratic ethical valuation.
Ontology is an enquiry into the nature of being. While science seeks to uncover causal
mechanisms (for example, how the supply of money influence prices and value), ontology
enquires into the nature of the entities posited in science: it would address questions like
‘what is money?’ or ‘what is value?’ rather than the specific mechanisms through which
money influences prices and value. The capability approach is an answer to a specific
ontological question, namely ‘what is human well-being’, which is defined by Sen in terms
of human functionings (what a human being is or does) and human capabilities (the set of
potential functionings). As Lawson (2003, p. 304) notes: ‘In the case of ethics, [ontology]
can serve to constrain what is possible and to encourage research into specific substantive,
including anthropological, issues.’ This is precisely what happens with Sen’s capability
approach, which provides the grounds for the development of more specific approaches
within human development, while bringing back the rich philosophical anthropology of
the classical political economists, as Walsh (2000, 2003, 2008) argues.
As Sen explained in his presentation at Coimbra, the use of ontology in ethics should
not be taken to mean that the ethical values we attribute to a given object are themselves
another object. Sen (2009, p. 41) criticises the ascription of ontological existence to our
ethical values, which would then be ‘mysterious’ ethical objects. But although Sen
criticises a certain type of ontology (which posits ethical values as ethical objects), his
capability approach consists nevertheless in the characterisation of the space or objects for
ethical valuation to be undertaken (not only by the researcher, but through public debate).
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That is, the capability approach provides the description of (ontological) elements or
materials to be used for ethical evaluation, which is to proceed through public debate. In
this sense, it is an ontological approach, but one where the relevant objects are not ethical
values, but rather functionings and capabilities.3
Acentral consideration to take into account in the process of developing a neweconomic
theory, or a theory of justice, is that in both cases (economics and political theory) in Sen’s
view such a theory should not be formulated in terms of ideal situations which presuppose
ideal behaviour (such as in the mainstream approaches to both economics and political
theory), but rather in terms of actual behaviour and actual realisations. Like the classical
political economists Smith, Mill, Marx and also others of the Cambridge tradition like
Marshall, Pigou and Keynes (who belongs, however, to different branch of the Cambridge
tradition, initiated with his critique of Marshall and Pigou), Sen aims at a realist analysis,
rather than at the formulation of ideal theories. This means that the discussion of justice has
to proceed by drawing upon a description of actual reality and not on ideal situations. Thus,
for the evaluation of justice one needs a theory that provides a description of actual
outcomes and realisations. This is the point where Sraffa’s pure theory, the contributions of
heterodox economics (including the Cambridge Keynesian tradition) and Sen’s own
institutional analysis can be most helpful.
Classical political economy and vulgar political economy
Although there is much to be gained from a revival of classical political economy, this
project is certainly not an easy one. There is not only much substantive work to be done,
but also many difficult issues in the interpretation of classical political economy which are
relevant to its revival. In fact, even Sen and Sraffa’s own interpretations of classical
political economy are not congruent in many respects. A central issue is that while Sen
draws upon Smith, Mill andMarx, Sraffa does not see these authors as engaged in the same
project.
Sraffa (D3/12/4/10) distinguishes between the ‘classical’ political economists who had
a ‘right conception’ and the ‘vulgar’ political economists who were already heading
towards what would become Marshall’s economics:
A. Smith [and] Ricardo [and] Marx indeed began to corrupt the old idea of cost – from food to
labour. But their notion was still near enough to be in many cases equivalent. The
decomposition went on at a terrible speed from 1820 to 1870: Senior’s abstinence and Mill’s
mess of the whole thing. Cairnes brought it to the final stage «sacrifice» (Sraffa D3/12/4/2).
Sraffa (D3/12/4/3) notes that ‘Petty, on the other hand, in Political Arithmetick, expresses
himself in terms of Number,Weight orMeasure’, and does not go into an abstract notion of
labour. Sraffa also (D3/12/11/36) asserts that it was an error for Smith, Ricardo, Marx to
regard labour as a quantity, commensurated with value, saying that the term ‘labour’
should rather be used to designate ‘the whole process of production’.
This conception of ‘labour’ is similar to an idea that Sen (1982, 2005) advocates,
following Maurice Dobb, namely that the labour theory of value is important not only as a
prescriptive or predictive theory, but also essentially as a description of the labour process.
Walsh (2003) notes, and Sen (2005) agrees, that Sen’s conception of a ‘rich description’ is
similar to that of Dobb, but on this particular topic of the labour theory of value, we find
important similarities with an approach that Sraffa also entertained at least in some periods
(as explained in his unpublished writings). Furthermore, for Sraffa, this ‘error’ of regarding
labour as a quantity commensurated with value did not prevent Smith, Ricardo and Marx,
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who for Sraffa are ‘classical’ political economists, from achieving correct results. In fact,
after developing his approach in Production of Commodities, Sraffa came to see how value
could be reduced to dated quantities of labour by finding a direct proportion between value
and labour in the particular case when all the surplus goes to wages, leading to what he saw
as a ‘Value Theory of Labour,’ rather than an ‘Labour Theory of Value,’ as Kurz and
Salvadori (2005, p. 80) explain.
So for Sraffa, Smith, Ricardo and Marx were not far from achieving nearly correct
results, which they were prevented from fully achieving only because they did not possess a
mathematics that allowed them to determine the surplus simultaneously with prices. But in
what concerns authors like Malthus, Stuart Mill, Senior and Cairnes, who Sraffa
characterises as the ‘vulgar’ political economists, Sraffa has a different view. Sraffa
(D3/12/4/10) argues that the latter are ‘[a]ll wrong’, since ‘they have the wrong conceptions
of modern economics and the rudimentary techniques of the classical’.
Sraffa (D3/12/4/10) thus regards ‘classical political economy’ as the period ‘From Petty
to Ricardo,’ while ‘vulgar political economy’ is the period ‘From Malthus to Stuart Mill.’
Concerning ‘vulgar political economy’, Sraffa writes it is a ‘Period dominated byMill,’ and
that ‘Marx stands here towering as the last of the classical amongst the vulgar, just as Smith
stood isolated among the classical, being the first of the vulgars’ (Sraffa D3/12/4/10). Sraffa
(D3/12/4/10) then defines ‘economics’ as the stage that came after ‘vulgar political
economy’, and as being ‘the age of Marshall’. But he sees all three stages of ‘classical
political economy’, ‘vulgar political economy’ and ‘economics’, as being influenced by
Smith. Sraffa (D3/12/4/10) writes that ‘A. Smith had stronger «vulgar» tendencies,’ and so
is ‘[t]ruly the father of modern economics’.
Thus, Sraffa is quite uncertain as to where to place Smith. He is less uncertain on Mill,
who is for Sraffa quintessentially the ‘vulgar’ economist. As Garegnani (1998, p. 426)
argues, Stuart Mill was ‘the key figure in the post-classical transition to modern supply and
demand analysis’. Mill was a fundamental influence on Sidgwick and then Marshall’s
thinking, leading to what Sraffa calls ‘economics’. However, it is also true thatMill came to
change his mind about many of his earlier doctrines which would make him a ‘vulgar’
political economist, such as the theory of the wages fund (in Mill’s famous recantation)
and the idea that economic action is solely driven by narrow self-interest. Also, if
‘vulgar political economy’ is typically seen as an uncritical apologetic for the capitalist
system, it is true that Mill came to criticise the capitalist system of his time and entertained
various perspectives on socialism.
A critique of many of the features of capitalism identified byMarx is indeed something
we find not just in Mill, but already in Smith. As Emma Rothschild argued in her
presentation at Coimbra (14 March 2011) titled ‘Values and Classical Political Economy,’
the critics of Smith have paid little attention to his criticism of masters and merchants and
the politics of money. Central issues to be addressed in this connection have to do with the
political conditions of free exchange, the morality of long distance relationships (which
were central in colonialism), the uses of money in politics and the values of commercial
societies. Many of the issues above are typically seen as being part of Marx’s concerns but
not necessarily part of Smith’s concerns. But as Rothschild shows, the use of money to
influence ideas and values or the political influence on free trade was very central to Smith
too who saw these as important problems in the commercial system he defended. For
Rothschild, the most serious of these problems is the conflict between the values of the
commercial society and other virtues which are necessary for the commercial society to
function. This leads to a basic insecurity in the capitalist system, and in a coalition between
‘Laissez-Faire’ and conservative values.
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AsRothschild points out, the problem here is that the values that support the commercial
system are ‘uncommercial’ values, and the expansion of the commercial system and its
values conflicts with these very values. This tendency for the uncommercial values which
support capitalism to be destroyed by commercial values [which Schumpeter (1992) also
addressed much after Smith] undermines not just the basis of the reproduction of the
economic system, but also the basis for the reproduction of society, since it undermines
justice which for Smith is its main pillar. As Smith argues:
Beneficence [...] is less essential to the existence of society than justice. Society may subsist,
though not in the most comfortable state, without beneficience; but the prevalence of injustice
must utterly destroy it... [Beneficence] is the ornament which embellishes, not the foundation
which supports the building, and which is, therefore, sufficient to recommend, but by no
means necessary to impose. Justice, on the contrary, is the main pillar that upholds the whole
edifice (Smith 2002, p. 101).
Following a famous passage from the Wealth of Nations, mainstream economists often
interpret Smith as the author who argues that society improves if every human agent
follows her or his self-interest – an example, discussed by Sen (1987), is George Stigler.
This is an interpretation of Smith which makes him conform to ‘vulgar political economy’.
Others tend to resort to the Theory of Moral Sentiments to show how sympathy, and
benevolence are also essential to Smith, and to show how Smith goes beyond the approach
commonly attributed to ‘vulgar political economy’.
However, for Smith (2002, p. 101) justice was the key virtue. Beneficence was also
important, though ‘less essential to the existence of society than justice’. Although Smith
was significantly influenced by Francis Hutcheson and his system, where virtue consists in
benevolence, Smith took virtue to depend not on benevolence but on propriety, which in
turn requires the proper degree amongst multiple affections. Part of the reason, then, why
Sraffa and Sen have different assessments of different authors like Smith and Mill is that
while Sraffa focuses on the theory of value, Sen advances a multidimensional perspective
of well-being. Smith, Mill and Marx, the authors mentioned by Sen, certainly had a
multidimensional conception of human well-being. At the same time, it is true that the
writings of Smith and Mill contain many aspects which seem to anticipate modern
economics, while Marx surely made it very clear where and how he stood against those
aspects in Smith and Mill.4
In fact, for Sraffa, ‘economics’ (the age of Marshall which arises with the marginalist
revolution) emerged because ‘[a]t the end of the vulgar period came Marx and caused
economics’, which would mean for Sraffa (D3/12/4/10) that the marginalist revolution
was a reaction to Marx’s critique of the apologetic ‘vulgar political economy’. It is
certainly true that the marginalist revolution, and the Cartesian mathematics that became
dominant in the twentieth century, led mainstream economics to neglect many of the
important issues Marx raised. I would add that just as ‘political economy’ may be divided
into a ‘classical’ and a ‘vulgar’ period, as Sraffa argues, so can ‘economics’ be divided into
a ‘neoclassical’ period and a ‘vulgar’ period. On the one hand, we have the Marshallian,
neoclassical beginnings of ‘economics’, underpinned by a multidimensional approach to
human well-being, and on the other hand, we have mainstream microeconomics and its
unidimensional conception of well-being and rationality. Thus, if Marshall’s theory of
value is a ‘vulgar’ theory according to Sraffa (since it follows the supply and demand
analysis of Say, Malthus and Stuart Mill), then Marshall’s realist methodology was
certainly in line with the classical methodology. Later in the twentieth century, we see the
rise of the contemporary mainstream approach, which is characterised by a Cartesian
mathematics divorced from reality, and engages also in a ‘vulgarisation’ of Marshall’s
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neoclassical economics (while adopting the designation of ‘neoclassical economics’ but
not Marshall’s methodology).5
In fact, even if we agreewith Sraffa’s critique ofMarshall’s partial equilibrium analysis,
we can also acknowledge that Marshall’s overall perspective was, at a more general level, a
rich andmultidimensional conception ofwell-being.Marshall (1920) shows how the source
of well-being is human activity, and how subjective utility, or our wants, are created by our
activities, and are thus not a stable ground for economic analysis, contrary to what Jevons
and the marginalists argue. Thus Marshall concludes, criticising Banfield and Jevons:
It is not true therefore that ‘the Theory of Consumption is the scientific basis of economics’.
For much that is of chief interest in the science of wants, is borrowed from the science of
efforts and activities. These two supplement one another; either is incomplete without the
other. But if either, more than the other, may claim to be the interpreter of the history of man,
whether on the economic side or any other, it is the science of activities and not that of wants
(Marshall 1920, p. 76).
Indeed, Marshall (1920, pp. 76–77) criticises Jevons for regarding consumption and
subjective utility as the basis of economic analysis. But mainstream economics, following
Jevons and Walras, and contrary to Marshall, adopted a subjectivist conception of well-
being. It is this subjective conception of well-being, which now underpins the mainstream
economics that Sen criticises, adopting a conception of well-being centred on the human
capability to engage in valuable activities. In this sense, Sen’s approach to well-being has
many similarities with Marshall’s (and the Cambridge ‘welfare’ tradition continued by
Pigou), who was also deeply concerned with human well-being.
Nonetheless, Marshall’s deep concern with human well-being, which characterises the
Cambridge economic tradition from Sidgwick, Marshall and Pigou to Sen, may not be
clear in his writings because, as Sraffa suggests in his unpublished writings, the way in
which Marshall expressed his theory was essentially strategic:
Marshall wrote to be read by business man, because he wanted to have influence on economic
life – conscious class bias. His true intuitions were in the footnotes to be hidden, and
understandable only to experts (Sraffa D3/12/11/31).
But a proper assessment of the place of Marshall and his approach, continued by
Pigou (1946), which generated the Cambridge economic tradition, is beyond the scope of
this article, which addresses the topic of the revival of classical political economy as
advanced by Sraffa and Sen.
Concluding remarks
Amartya Sen has convincingly argued for a change in economic theory and political
theory. In both fields, Sen argues for a perspective focused on actual economic and
political reality and not on ideal and fictitious situations of perfect knowledge or perfect
justice. Thus, Sen (1977) argued against the conception of a ‘rational fool’ who engages in
optimisation given complete preferences, noting not only that preferences may be
incomplete but also that rationality consists in the ability to scrutinise one’s goals, values
and preferences, not in following a particular (complete) preference ordering.
Sen also criticised the understanding of human well-being undertaken in mainstream
economics in its reliance upon utilitarian philosophy. As an alternative, he proposes his
capability approach to the assessment of human (actual and potential) well-being. Sen’s
book The Theory of Justice marks an important development of Sen’s analysis of human
well-being. Grounded in his previous work on the capability approach, he moves towards a
conception of justice that goes beyond the characterisation of ideal situations. However, the
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significance of Sen’s contribution springs not only from its providing an approach to
economic theory and political theory that goes beyond the mainstream characterisation of
ideal situations, but also from its providing an integrated approach to both fields: economic
theory and political theory. As Vivian Walsh and Hilary Putnam argue, Sen’s thinking
constitutes a revival of the philosophical anthropology of classical political economy,
complementing Sraffa’s revival of the analytical framework of classical political economy.
And analogously to Sraffa, who proposes a multidimensional perspective of production,
grounded on the work of classical political economists, Sen proposes a multidimensional
perspective of behaviour and well-being which recovers the approach of Smith, Mill and
Marx.6
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Notes
1. I address the relationship between Sraffa’s revival of classical political economy, Sen’s
approach and heterodox economics in Martins (forthcoming).
2. I am indebted to Geoffrey Harcourt for the reference to Wildon Carr.
3. A study of the ontological nature of the capability approach also helps us see how the capability
approach can be developed within social theory (Martins 2006, 2009a; Smith and Seward 2009),
ethical theory (Martins 2007a, 2007b; Pelle´ 2009), technology studies (Oosterlaken 2011) or
environmental studies (Martins 2011b). For a discussion of Sen’s (2009, p. 41) critique of the
ascription of ontological status to ethical values, see Martins (2012).
4. For example, in Marx’s distinction between the ‘esoteric’ aspects of Smith’s writings, which
contain fundamental scientific insights of classical political economy, and the ‘exoteric’ aspects
of Smith’s writings, which anticipate the vulgarisation of political economy.
5. Of course, some mainstream macroeconomics became instead a ‘vulgarisation’ of the work of
Marshall’s most famous student and critic, John Maynard Keynes, leading mainstream
macroeconomics into what Robinson (1962) calls ‘bastard Keynesianism’. We may add that
much mainstream microeconomics is, in a similar sense, a ‘bastard’ neoclassicism, grounded in
Jevons’ subjectivist perspective, or Walrasian formalism, having lost sight of the Marshallian
broad, and multidimensional, approach.
6. In Martins (2011a), I develop in more detail the relation between Sraffa’s multidimensional
perspective and Sen’s multidimensional perspective and also Sen’s critique of the mainstream
approach to rationality.
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